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Essay:
How Malleability Matters
Jason Rantanen1
In The Malleability of Patent Rights, I developed the concept
that patent rights are malleable rather than static and fixed,
distinguishing malleability from the idea that patent rights
are merely uncertain. Malleability refers to the idea that the
strength and scope of patent rights can be altered by the
actors who interact with a patent well after it has issued.
Patent law is full of mechanisms that allow for these postissuance changes, yet there seems to be no good theoretical
argument that supports malleability. At best, I concluded, the
costs of malleability must be weighed against the doctrinal
cures, and perhaps those cures themselves would come with
greater costs of their own. This Essay builds upon The
Malleability of Patent Rights to explain how viewing patent
rights as malleable can dramatically alter conventional
narratives of the patent system—both narratives told by
supporters of strong patent rights and narratives told by
those who argue that the patent system must be changed to
favor competitors. In doing so, this Essay provides examples
of how the malleable nature of patent rights can present real
problems for the patent system.

Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law. I thank
Christina Bohannan, Steve Burton, Tun-Jen Chiang, Tom Cotter, John
Duffy, Richard Epstein, Paul Gowder, Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark
Lemley, Peter Menell, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Oskar Liivak, Robert
Miller, Todd Pettys, Michael Risch, Dave Schwartz, Jacob Sherkow,
Greg Vetter, and the audience members and participants at the Drake
Intellectual Property Roundtable, the Patent Conference 4, and the
Iowa Legal Studies Workshop for very helpful discussions about the
project and comments on an earlier draft. I also thank my research
assistants Alex Lodge, Rajul Patel and Andrew Stanley for help in
preparing this Article.
1

IP THEORY | VOL 6 | ISSUE 1 | 2016

2

HOW MALLEABILITY MATTERS

Introduction
In The Malleability of Patent Rights, I developed the concept of
malleability: that the strength and scope of patent rights can be
altered by the actors who interact with a patent well after it has
issued.2 The rights granted by a particular patent are not fixed
in the sense that they are immutable and unalterable. Rather,
they can be pushed and pulled. Their very existence and shape
can be changed through an array of legal mechanisms.
I contrasted this view of patent rights with the predominant
view, which conceives of patent rights as fundamentally static
and unchanging, frozen forever at the moment the patent issues.
Even when scholars, lawyers, judges, and policy makers
recognize that there are uncertainties inherent in patent rights,
they tend to view those uncertainties as just a puzzle to solve
with, ultimately, a “right” answer, or as a hopelessly
indeterminate problem whose resolution is essentially a roll of
the dice. Malleability embodies a different characteristic: that
regardless of whether one views patent rights as certain or
probabilistic, the scope of the patent right or the likelihood of a
particular roll can be deliberately changed during a patent’s
term.3
In this Essay, I explore the consequences of viewing patent
rights as malleable. I offer two scenarios in which recognizing
the malleability of patent rights can alter conventional
narratives told about those rights. In the first, I apply the
concept of malleability to the primary narrative articulated by
supporters of emerging patent monetization strategies, a
narrative that draws upon two arguments: that such strategies
are economically efficient because (1) they ensure that
inventors receive their just rewards for the teachings of the
patent, and (2) they reduce the costs of transacting over patent
rights. Because patent rights are malleable, however, patent
owners can actively expand the scope and strength of those
rights independent of a patent’s technological teachings. In
Jason Rantanen, The Malleability of Patent Rights 2015 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 895 (2015).
2

3 For a much more extensive description of the concept of malleability,

including how it operates and possible theoretical justifications, see
id.
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other words, patent owners can extract revenue not only by
reducing transaction costs, adding to the value of the underlying
technology, or (in the conventional challenge to the narrative)
reaping nuisance costs,4 but also by expanding the patent right
itself after it has issued. This insight leads to an alternative
narrative, one that neither revolves around efficiency gains nor
invokes the critique of nuisance costs.
But malleability can work the other way, too: it can be used to
push back against the scope and strength of a patent, even if the
teachings of the patent reflect an important advancement in the
art. Beyond the presence of at least two parties in every patent
lawsuit, including an accused infringer who can shove back on
patent scope and strength, is the existence of mechanisms that
expressly allow patent challengers to push on claim scope or to
even terminate the patent right after it has issued. In particular,
the recently-implemented mechanisms of inter partes review
and covered business method review affect the malleability of
the patent right in a remarkably one-sided way. Furthermore,
the consequences of these new mechanisms are not limited to
just so-called “low-quality” patents but can affect a much
broader range of patents.

I. The Malleability of Patent Rights and the EfficientInvention Narrative
One of the most (if not the most) complex, prominent, and
divisive issues in patent law today is whether emerging patent
See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUS. L.
REV. 325, 342 (2012) (discussing “the incentive that exists to assert
patents because defending against patent demands is expensive, and,
therefore, induces settlement”); Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and
Patent Examination, 2 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 687, 707–11 (2010) (discussing
the problems of nuisance patents); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing
Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 368 (2010) (stating that nonpracticing
entities “are often termed ‘patent trolls,’ because they tend to exploit
litigation and licensing market defects to extract unwarranted rents
from commercializers, usually on patents that the commercializer
was completely unaware of before the NPE’s demand for payment”);
Ranganath Sudarshan, Nuisance-Value Patent Suits: An Economic
Model and Proposal, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 159,
160–62 (2008).
4
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monetization strategies—a collective term that encompasses
actors such as non-practicing entities, patent-assertion entities,
and similar business models—are beneficial or harmful as a
matter of public policy.5 The primary policy argument in favor
of these strategies rests on a relatively simple narrative that I
refer to as the “efficient-invention narrative.” In this section,
I examine this narrative and explain its normative pull—a pull
that rests largely on the view that patent rights are fixed.
A. The Efficient-Invention Narrative
The “efficient-invention narrative” refers to the idea that patentassertion entities and other entities who acquire patents in
order to monetize them are fundamentally beneficial from an
economic perspective because they make the patent system
operate more smoothly and effectively.
The narrative is woven through most aspects of the public
persona of every entity engaged in emerging patent
monetization strategies — that is, profit-generating commercial
strategies based on the buying, licensing, and enforcing of
patented technologies without any meaningful attempt to
practice the technology of the patent.6 Labels for such entities

See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, Professor-to-Professor: You Are Wrong about
Patent
Reform,
PATENTLY-O
(Mar.
10,
2015),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/03/professor-patentreform.html.
5

For examples of such strategies, see Peter Detkin, Leveling the Patent
Playing Field, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 636, 637–40 (2007);
Raymond P. Niro, Who is Really Undermining the Patent System—
“Patent Trolls” or Congress?, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 185,
190–97 (2007); Patrick Ennis, Patents Are Recipes, Not Monopolies, on
Invention,
INTELL.
VENTURES
(Nov.
18,
2013),
http://www.intellectualventures.com/insights/archives/patentsrecipes-not-monopolies-on-invention; Paul Schneck, Not So Scary,
After All: In Defense of Patent Trolls, FORBES (Feb. 1, 2013, 8:19 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2013/02/01/not-soscary-after-all-in-defense-of-patent-trolls; Adam Mossoff & Nathan
Myhrvold, The Future of Invention—What’s at Risk (Sept. 12, 2013)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.intellectualventures.com/assets_docs/Future_of_Invent
ion_Whats_at_Risk_Transcript_2013_Speech.pdf).
6
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are numerous, from “patent-assertion entity”7 (PAE) to “patent
dealer,”8 “patent intermediary”9 to “patent troll.”10 These labels
are almost useless as meaningful categories, however, since
entities engaged in emerging patent monetization strategies are
even more diverse than the strategies themselves,11 leading to a
morass of categorization attempts that are doomed to failure.
On this, both sides of the debate over such entities agree.12
For this reason, although I refer to the concept of PAEs
below, I do so only as a touchstone: a basic point around which
to orient rather than a precisely defined category. Rather, the
better way to think of these entities is as a collection of their
attributes and behaviors. For now, however, it suffices to
reference PAEs in order to sketch out the dimensions of the
efficient-invention narrative upon which most—if not all—
emerging patent monetization strategies draw to support the
idea that they are economically beneficial.13
7 Colleen

V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The New Complex
Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62
HASTINGS L.J. 297, 300 (2010) (coining the term “patent-assertion
entity”).
James McDonough III, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An
Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea
Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 212 (2006).
8

Allen W. Wang, Rise of the Patent Intermediaries, 25 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 159, 160 (2010).
9

See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation,
Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583,
1583 (2009).
10

See Chien, supra note 7, at 320 (describing a “complex patent
ecosystem”).
11

See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest
for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2121–29 (2013); Michael Risch,
Patent Portfolios as Securities, 63 DUKE L.J. 89, 127–28 (2013); David
L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing
Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 428–33 (2014).
12

While this narrative may be a powerful one, it is important to keep
in mind its limitations. There is evidence that suggests that patent
assertions involving actual copying of technology may be rare. See,
e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law,
87 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1423–24 (2009) (finding that outside of
pharmaceutical cases, virtually no patent lawsuits involve a defendant
who obtained the technology from the plaintiff).
13
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A hypothetical14 illustrates the basic premise of the
narrative:
After decades of experience working in the
chemical and semiconductor industries, Dr. C
decides to devote himself full-time to inventing and
experimenting in his own laboratory. After several
years, Dr. C develops two technologies for
enhancing computer microprocessors: one that can
be used in nearly all microprocessors to boost their
speed and one that will make a specific type of
microprocessor much more efficient. He obtains
multiple patents on his technologies and shows
these patents to several microchip companies.
Despite telling him that they are not interested, all
of the companies incorporate Dr. C’s first
technology into their own products. Worse, Dr. C is
unable to find any companies that could make use
of his second microprocessor advance.
Disheartened and lacking the resources to mount
an effective lawsuit against the infringers (who
have deep pockets of their own), Dr. C gives up
inventing and spends his life golfing.
This hypothetical illuminates two fundamental failures.
First, it illustrates the breakdown of the fundamental
mechanism by which patent law operates to promote
technological progress (i.e., the market reward for inventing).15
The basic mechanism by which patent law encourages
invention is to give the inventor exclusive rights over the new
technology that enable that inventor to charge
supracompetitive prices in the marketplace.16 Inventors are
This hypothetical is based on the story of Dr. James Cunningham, as
told by Detkin, supra note 6, at 639.
14

See, e.g., CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 33 (3d ed. 2014)
(“The historically predominant theory [of patent law] is the incentive
to invent . . . .”); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 294 (2004) (“The standard
rationale of patent law is that it is an efficient method of enabling the
benefits of research and development to be internalized, thus
promoting innovation and technological progress.”).
15

See, e.g., Jason Rantanen, Peripheral Disclosure, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 1,
10 (2012) (“The patent system encourages investment in
technological development by giving the investor who first
16
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then able to monetize their invention either by practicing the
invention themselves and charging a supracompetitive price or
by licensing the right to use the technology to others.17
In the above hypothetical, however, Dr. C was unable to
monetize his invention using either approach. He was not able
to practice the invention himself in any commercially
meaningful way because, as an independent inventor, he lacked
the necessary resources. Nor was he able to license the
technology to those who could practice it on a commercial scale;
the semiconductor companies stole it outright. Note that Dr. C’s
ownership of a patent did not change the outcome. Because he
lacked the ability to present a meaningful threat of enforcement,
the companies simply trod on his rights.18
When inventors are unable to capture the value of their
inventions, they have fewer resources to invest in creating
future inventions. Even worse, an inventor may simply
conclude, as Dr. C did, that she is better off not inventing; with a
smaller expectation of monetary reward ex ante, inventors have
less incentive to begin inventing in the first place.19 Potential
investors, too, will be less willing to devote resources to
research and development for similar reasons: they will be
unable to share in any of the value of the invention.20
The above hypothetical also illustrates a second failure, one
due to transaction costs. Recall that Dr. C developed a second
technology that was fairly specific but was unable to find a
company that used the specific semiconductor design required
successfully develops a new product or method the possibility of
obtaining exclusive rights over that invention, allowing the inventor
to charge a supra-competitive price during the patent’s life.”).
17

Id. at 16 n.63.

As framed, this story draws upon the idea of patents as a solution to
Arrow’s Paradox. One alternate criticism of the narrative, then, is that
as Michael Burstein points out, the multi-faceted nature of
information may mean that there is an array of solutions to Arrow’s
Paradox that do not require intellectual property protections. See
Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information Without Intellectual
Property, 91 TEX. L. REV. 227, 258–70 (2012), In other words, Dr. C
could have monetized his invention through alternate mechanisms,
and the dichotomy of patent-or-nothing is false.
18

19

LANDES & POSNER, supra note 15, at 13.

20

LANDES & POSNER, supra note 15, at 13; Risch, supra note 12, at 128.
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to take advantage of it. This is an example of a transaction failure
due to transaction costs that are simply too high.21 Inventors
need to find potential users of their technologies; potential
users need to find inventors.22 This can be quite difficult and
costly.
Furthermore, even if a transaction does occur, it will likely
involve substantial costs. For example, the parties will need to
deal with Arrow’s Information Paradox (the problem that
inventors must disclose information about the invention in
order to attract investors, which in turn destroys the secrecy of
the information, and hence its value).23 Although that problem
may be addressed through mechanisms other than patents24 it
will nonetheless impose at least some costs on information
exchange.25
But what happens when a third party gets involved on Dr.
C’s behalf? What if, rather than holding on to his patents, Dr. C
sold them to a company that was in the business of buying and
enforcing patents?26 Consider the following modification of the
hypothetical:
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 15, at 16–17; see also Harold Demsetz,
Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 348–49
(1967) (discussing transaction costs in general).
21

22

McDonough, supra note 8, at 213–14.

See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of
Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE
ACTIVITY, 609 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research ed. 1962).
23

Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as
IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 336–37 (2008) (arguing that trade
secret law partially solves Arrow’s Paradox); Burstein, supra note 18,
at 262–70 (describing non-intellectual property mechanisms for
addressing the information exchange paradox).
24

Such costs include paying attorneys to draft confidentiality
agreements. Michael Burstein provides an extensive analysis of
various ways in which Arrow’s Paradox can be overcome and
discusses their limitations and costs. See Burstein, supra note 18, at
227. Burstein suggests, however, that information is far more complex
than conventionally assumptions allow for and the degree to which it
is appropriable in the context of an information exchange. For
purposes of this Article, however, the important point remains:
exchanging information is costly—perhaps more so than the existing
literature has recognized.
25

That is what happened in the real story. Detkin, supra note 6, at 644
(“Dr. Cunningham, for example, sold his suite of semiconductor
26
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While golfing one day, Dr. C meets the CEO of an
entity called Innovation Unpacked Corp. (“IUC”).
IUC is a company that acts as “the bridge between
invention and application”27 to generate “a strong
return on investment,” purchasing “inventions
from individual inventors and companies of all
sizes” and licensing “them to the world’s most
innovative companies.”28 Dr. C agrees to assign his
patents to IUC for a substantial sum plus a small
share of any licensing revenue that IUC obtains
from the patents.
Following this initial transaction, IUC contacts the
semiconductor companies that Dr. C had initially
approached. Recognizing IUC’s substantial
experience in the patent assertion-field, most of the
semiconductor entities quickly agree to a
nonexclusive license to the patents. IUC then
proceeds to bring an infringement action against
the holdout, in which it prevails, in part due to its
substantial expertise in patent infringement
lawsuits and highly skilled attorneys. IUC is also
able to use its knowledge of the industry to identify
a company that could make use of Dr. C’s second,
more specific technological advance and licenses
that patent as well.
In this scenario, IUC fulfills two positive economic
functions.29 First, it forces transactions to occur that would
patents to Intellectual Ventures in exchange for a lump sum payment
in a transaction that took far less time than a typical licensing
negotiation.”).
27

ACACIA RESEARCH CORP., http://acaciaresearch.com/

Sell
Your
Patents,
INTELLECTUAL
VENTURES,
http://www.intellectualventures.com/services-solutions/sell
28

Fiona Scott Morton and Carl Shapiro offer another articulation of
this narrative:
29

An inventor has discovered and patented valuable technology, but she
lacks the assets to exploit it herself and is having difficulty finding
downstream firms that can do so. She also is having difficulty locating
downstream firms that have copied her technology and are not paying
royalties. She sells her patent to a PAE that is skilled at finding
downstream firms to which the technology can be transferred. The
PAE also is good at locating unscrupulous firms that have copied the
patented technology and are using it without paying, by hiding and by
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otherwise constitute theft of the patented technology: a onesided exchange under which the inventor receives nothing and
the user of the technology gets all.30 In other words, PAEs solve
the free-riding problem by making sure that there is a credible
enforcement threat.31 They can centralize the gathering of
information and closely monitor users.32 PAEs may also have
particular expertise in patent enforcement,33 allowing them to
send out more letters and, perhaps, litigate more efficiently.34
PAEs may also have more resources to bring a credible threat of
litigation and extract a fair license than an individual inventor.35
ignoring demand letters. The PAE also is skillful at negotiating
reasonable royalties, in part due to its litigation capabilities. In this
narrative, the PAE improves the functioning of the market for ideas,
enhances returns to inventors, and promotes innovation.
Fiona M. Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Strategic Patent Acquisitions, 79
ANTITRUST L.J. 463, 479 (2014)
See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, PATENT ASSERTION AND
U.S. INNOVATION 3 (2013) (“[P]otential inventors may not have the
resources to protect their patents from infringement; their incentives
to invent may be increased if they can sell their patents to firms that
specialize in litigation and other means to collect license fees from
those who are using the patented technology.”) [hereinafter
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL].
30

See generally McDonough, supra note 8, at 206–12 (explaining “[a]t
a minimum, there must be a credible threat of litigation to incentivize
potential infringers to license the patent”).
31

32 See

PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL, supra note 30, at 3; McDonough, supra note
8, at 212.
See http://www.cnet.com/news/inside-intellectual-ventures-themost-hated-company-in-tech/
33

34 See

President’s Council, supra note 30, at 3; U.S. Gov’t Accountability
Office, GAO-13-465, Intellectual Property: Assessing Factors That
Affect Patent Infringement Litigation Could Help Improve Patent
Quality 3 n.8 (2013) (noting that because PAEs do not make products,
they have lower discovery costs, which can cost several million dollars
in complex litigation); Lemley & Melamed, supra note 12, at 2147–52,
2162.
See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL, supra note 30, at 3 (“[P]otential inventors
may not have the resources to protect their patents from
infringement; their incentives to invent may be increased if they can
sell their patents to firms that specialize in litigation and other means
to collect license fees from those who are using the patented
technology.”); Brief for United Inventors Assoc. & Tech. Licensing
Corp. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 5, eBay v.
35
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Additionally, PAEs consolidate all of these resources into a
single unit that, according to their marketing message, can
secure more value than many other types of patent holders.36
Second, PAEs may know exactly whom to contact and
negotiate with because of their concentration of knowledge and
expertise.37 For many of the same reasons discussed above,
PAEs can reduce the costs of patent rights transactions: they can
act as centralized clearinghouses for rights, where both
production entities and inventors can go to transact, thus
greatly reducing the information cost of transacting.38
Thus, under this efficient-invention narrative, PAEs should
be at least tolerated—and certainly not punished—because
they reduce transaction costs and ensure that inventors receive

MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130) (“Often
times…inventors are forced to litigate against would-be licensees,
who have the economic clout and resources to drain inventors and tie
them up in costly litigation.”); McDonough, supra note 8, at 209; Sannu
K. Shrestha, Note, Trolls or Market-Makers?An Empirical Analysis of
Nonpracticing Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 114, 126–27 (2010).
See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL, supra note 30, at 3 (“[I]t can be costly for
technology users to find all potentially-relevant patents. Effective
brokering of patents by intermediaries can therefore increase the
value of patents, fostering greater incentives to innovate.”);
McDonough, supra 8, at 212; see also Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A.
Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 267 (2007) (noting that
under a Coasean perspective, “[p]roperty rights can be a useful
institution for reducing transaction costs where such rights delegate
decisionmaking authority to the entity with the closest connection to
and best information regarding the resource”).
36

See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL, supra note 30, at 3 (“Patent intermediaries
can play a useful social role. Inventors and buyers of patents (such as
a manufacturer who can commercialize patented inventions) may
have a difficult time finding each other because the potential
usefulness of a patented technology is often not obvious, and often
depends on the complementarity between the protected technology
and the buyer’s own portfolio of technology.”).
37

PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL, supra note 30, at 3 (“[PAEs] bring value to
society by more efficiently matching patent holders to patent buyers,
thereby fostering transfer of technology from inventors to those who
can use the technology to make products that are valuable to
consumers.”); Lemley & Melamed, supra note 12, at 2155–62.
38
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the rewards for invention to which they are entitled by virtue of
the patent grant.39
B. The Narrative Inverted
How does the reconceptualization of patent rights as malleable
interact with the efficient-invention narrative? As laid out in the
previous section, the efficient-invention narrative is based on
the dual arguments that (1) PAEs ensure that inventors receive
their due rewards and (2) PAEs enhance the efficiency of the
patent transaction by reducing transaction costs.
Yet, the narrative begins to break down when the malleable
nature of patent rights is considered. Both the scope and
strength of patent rights can be altered after issuance,
independent of the underlying technological disclosure.40 In
other words, because patent law doctrine operates only as an
elastic leash over the scope of the patent rights relative to the
underlying technology disclosed in the patent,41 it is possible to
expand the scope of the patent rights without doing anything
with the technological teachings of the patent. Viewed in this
light, patents are less embodiments of technology and more like
rights alone. The consequence is that only a portion of the
enforced scope of patent rights may reflect the inventor’s actual
contribution. Instead, some of the value that a patent
middleman extracts can be due to its own expansion of the
Some commentators also offer a third benefit: clearing the market
and improving patent liquidity. See, e.g., McDonough, supra note 8, at
214–16; Yuichi Watanabe, Comment, Patent Licensing and the
Emergence of a New Patent Market, 9 HOUS. BUS. & TAX. L.J. 445, 460–
62 (2009). This is essentially a combination of reducing transaction
costs and ensuring that inventors receive their due rewards, rather
than a true separate benefit. In other words, patents are perceived as
more liquid precisely because the costs for transacting around them
are reduced and patents actually have value in the hands of inventors,
rather than being merely worthless pieces of paper.
39

As I discuss in The Malleablity of Patent Rights, this independence is
not perfect; rather patent law doctrine does impose some constraints
on the degree to which patent scope can depart from the technological
disclosure of the document. See Rantanen, supra note 1. Thus, patent
law doctrine operates more like an elastic leash than a rigid chain on
patent scope.
40

For a discussion of how patent law doctrine operates in this way,
see Rantanen, supra note 1.
41
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rights and not due to the value of the teachings of the patent.
Due to the malleable nature of patent rights, a patent claim in
the right hands can have greater scope than a patent claim in
someone else’s hands.
When patent rights are viewed as malleable, the tale takes
an unexpected twist: the efficient use of patent rights (the
hallmark of a good PAE) may, instead, be simply the expansion
of rights ex post. This expansion is very different than additional
social gains in the form of more efficient transactions or in
merely making others aware of the value of the new technology.
Instead, what is occurring may be an expansion of the rights
alone, capturing more and more territory with the same patent.
Moreover, this expansion can occur without any increase in the
value of the teachings of the patent.42 To use a property analogy,
it is as if A purchased a plot of land with area X and was able to
increase its area to X+Y simply because it chose to do so; no
increase in the value of the property is necessary for the
expansion to occur.
In other words, the better a PAE is at enforcing a patent, the
more likely the PAE is capturing value from sources other than
the inventor’s actual technological contribution because it is its
skill at enforcement that a PAE uses to broaden the effective
scope of patent rights. Also, more transactions are not simply a
benign result of greater efficiency and reduced transaction
costs. Rather, the alternative is that increases in the number of
There may be other changes to the strength of patent rights that
flow from changes in ownership. Consider, for example, what would
happen if Dr. C brought an infringement suit against an infringing
semiconductor company. That company would likely seek discovery
of Dr. C. It might be particularly interested in evidence of prior sales
or potential material for an inequitable conduct claim. It might
request the inventor’s own prosecution files. Responding to this
discovery will be costly for Dr. C; worse, it could turn up information
that would be useful in invalidity or unenforceability arguments. If,
however, Dr. C sells the patent to IUC, and IUC is the entity that files
the infringement complaint, the discovery burdens on the patent
holder will be less. IUC will presumably not have the same volume of
records that Dr. C has; indeed, it may have relatively little discoverable
material. It will also probably not have any evidence of prior sales or
potential material for an inequitable conduct claim. The result is that
IUC’s patent rights will effectively be greater because it will not have
the same baggage that Dr. C had.
42
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transactions may be due to an expanded patent scope capturing
more firms and people within its net.
This critique thus differs in two important ways from the
conventional challenge to the efficient-invention narrative,
which rests on the idea that PAEs are using patents to extract
nuisance costs (i.e., some settlement that is less than the cost of
a litigating a patent suit).43 First, this critique does not assume
that the patents being asserted are necessarily weak ones: the
focus is on making the patent right greater rather than on
attempting to capitalize on the accused infringer’s defense costs.
Second, malleability involves an actual change of the legal right
itself; a pushing on the boundary of that scope.
But wait; surely the accused infringers could do the exact
same thing but in reverse: shrink the effective scope of the
patent through effective argument and clever strategy?
Absolutely—skilled patent challengers may push back against
the scope and strength of patent rights. Patent infringement
suits do not involve unidirectional malleability, but instead can
be viewed as a battle between two sides, with each pushing and
pulling on the aspects of the patent that offer the greatest
potential for victory.
My point here, however, is simply the idea that entities who
specialize in patent transactions are inherently economically
efficient rests on an assumption that patent rights are fixed. If,
instead, patent rights are malleable, that assumption no longer
holds.44 Instead, it is the skill of the litigator, rather than the
contents of the patent right, that matter. Furthermore, if there
are systematic advantages possessed by some entities—such as
PAEs—due to the very nature of those entities, those
advantages can manifest as stronger, greater patent rights.
These types of unidirectional abilities that take advantage of the

See, e.g., Chien, supra note 4, at 342 (discussing “the incentive that
exists to assert patents because defending against patent demands is
expensive, and, therefore, induces settlement”).
43

Note that there may still be efficiencies gained from patent
transactions; particularly in terms of the consolidation of rights
relating to a particular technology. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro,
Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2005–08
(2007). I do not address that perspective here.
44
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malleability of patent rights are areas that merit especially close
scrutiny.

II. Malleability and Patent Reforms
Setting aside concerns about systematic imbalances between
litigants, patent infringement litigation typically offers both
parties the opportunity to take advantage of the malleability of
patent rights to more or less the same degree. This bidirectional malleability can be contrasted with situations where
the malleability is much more unidirectional—in other words,
situations where one party is able to take much greater
advantage of the malleability of patent rights than the other.
A powerful example of unidirectional malleability can be
found in recently implemented mechanisms for “patent reform”
(i.e., attempts to improve the functioning of the patent system
through legislative changes). A central element of these reform
efforts has been the development of new processes to weed out
low-quality patents—patents that should not have been granted
but nonetheless were.45 These mechanisms consist of several
new and revised procedural routes for challenging issued
patents.46 Members of Congress intended these mechanisms to
allow interested parties to challenge patents that fail to meet the
requirements of patentability or that claim too broadly,47 and
See, e.g., Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent
Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1827
(2007) (indicating that “low quality patents” are those that are
erroneously granted and of questionable validity); R. Polk Wagner,
Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135,
2138 (2009) (defining a low quality patent). The very concept of low
quality patents draws on the idea that patent rights are fixed, not
malleable: a patent is low quality because it never should have issued
but for a mistake made by someone. To be clear, I am not contending
here that there is no such thing a low quality patent; malleability does
not mean that a stone statue of a horse can be changed into a bronze
statue of a cat. I am simply pointing out that the language of
discussions about low quality patents inevitably draws upon the idea
of fixed rights.
45

46 See

DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 11.07 (2014) (discussing
post-issuance review mechanisms).
157 CONG. REC. E1184 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (statement of Rep.
Lamar Smith) (“This bill will provide the patent office with a fast,
47
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commentators hailed their creation.48 The rising popularity of
these tools speaks volumes about their perceived potency in
altering the patent right.
A. Inter Partes Review and Covered Business Method Review
A core component of the America Invents Act was the creation
of the inter partes review mechanism. This proceeding replaced
inter partes reexamination, a procedural mechanism
implemented by the American Inventors Protection Act of
199949 that allowed for an adversarial-style challenge to issued
patents at the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO).50 Inter partes reexamination was, from the perspective
of some, an unsuccessful experiment.51 While the outcomes of
inter partes reexamination proceedings favored petitioners as

precise vehicle to review low quality business method patents, which
the Supreme Court has acknowledged are often abstract and overly
broad.”). See generally Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of
the America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 598–612
(2012) (describing the legislative history of the America Invents Act’s
revisions to inter partes review and post-grant review).
See, e.g., Jay Kesan, America Invents, More or Less?, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 229, 234–35, 249 (2012) (“There are good reasons to
conclude that post-grant review and inter partes review will improve
patent quality.”); Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review:
An Early Look at the Numbers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 93, 105
(2014) (evaluating inter partes review outcomes and concluding
“Congress appears to have hit the mark—but only time will tell for
sure”).
48

49 See American Inventor’s Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113,

§ 4602–07, 113 Stat. 1501A-567–71 (1999).

For a critique of inter partes reexamination at the time of its initial
implementation, see Mark. D. Janis, Inter Partes Patent Reexamination,
10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 481 (1999).
50

See Love & Ambwani, supra note 48, at 95 (“Though originally
developed to serve as a cost-effective alternative to full-blown
litigation, reexaminations rarely realized that goal.”). But see Tun-Jen
Chiang, The Advantages of Inter Partes Reexamination, 90 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 579, 585 (2008) (arguing that “Contrary to the
conventional wisdom, inter partes reexamination has important and
often overlooked advantages compared to the other avenues of
contesting validity.”).
51
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often as not,52 a consensus had emerged at the time Congress
voted for the America Invents Act that inter partes
reexamination was largely ineffective in achieving its purpose:
to provide a low-cost mechanism for challenging invalid
patents.53 In large part, this was because the process was slow54
and allowed patent holders to easily amend their claims and
thus strengthen their patents.55 These attributes compounded
into a severe image problem for inter partes reexamination. In
short, a makeover was in order.
The new inter partes review moves further away from the
traditional examination model, where the focus is on a dialogue
between the applicant and the examiner, and toward a mini-trial

U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTER PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING
DATA,
SEPTEMBER
30,
2013,
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/inter_parte_historical_stats_ro
ll_up_EOY2013.pdf (reporting that out of the 305 inter partes
reexamination certificates issued between 1999 and September 2011,
44% had resulted in all claims being cancelled) [hereinafter INTER
PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA].
52

Love & Ambwani, supra note 48, at 95. That said, it should be noted
that towards the end of the period, inter partes reexamination was
seeing greater and greater use. See INTER PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING
DATA, supra note 52 (reporting an increase from 1 filing in 2001 to 374
filings in 2011). It should also be kept in mind that the effective date
provision of the statute implementing inter partes reexamination
limited its use to applications that were filed on or after November 29,
1999. See American Inventor’s Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. 106113, §4608, 113 Stat. 1501A-572 (1999). Because there were
relatively few patents meeting this requirement during the early
years of IPR, it should not be surprising that there few inter partes
reexaminations during that period either.
53

The process typically took about three years. See INTER PARTE
REEXAMINATION FILING DATA, supra note 52 (reporting an average
pendency of 36.2 months and a median of 32.9 months).
54

55 Love

& Ambwani, supra note 48, at 95 (“[R]eexamination developed
a well-deserved reputation for lengthy delays, a lack of decisive
results, and a permissiveness for claim amendments that led some in
the patent bar to view reexamination more as a vehicle for patentees
to strengthen their patent rights post hoc than as a tool for possible
infringers to quickly and cheaply eliminate invalid claims without
resorting to litigation.”).
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before a panel of patent office judges.56 This mini-trial is
streamlined to be completed within a year from the time review
is instituted.57 Negative incentives encourage parties who have
been sued for patent infringement in district court to file for
review quickly.58 Procedural mechanisms require the petitioner
to submit proposed claim constructions, which may necessitate
a responsive claim construction by the patent owner. 59 The
ability of the patent holder to offer iterative amendments has
also been sharply limited.60
The result of the new inter partes review mechanism has
been an explosion of filings.61 Some of this may be a “relaunch”

See Andrei Iancu Ben Haber & Elizabeth Iglesias, Inter Partes
Review is the New Normal: What Has Been Lost? What Has Been
Gained?, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 539, 541–42 (2012).
56

See 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) (2012) (requiring the Director to
prescribe specific regulations for the conduct of inter partes review,
including “that the final determination in an inter partes review be
issued not later than 1 year after the date on which the Director
notices the institution of a review under this chapter”). In practice,
this has turned out to be about 15 months, due to an automatic sixmonth stay at the discretion of the patent office. Love & Ambwani,
supra note 48, at 99.
57

58

See 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).

59 Iancu,

Haber & Iglesias, supra note 56, at 580 (concluding that being
required to provide an express claim construction disadvantages the
petitioner more than the patent owner).
Section 316 states that the Director of the Patent Office shall
prescribe regulations, inter alia, “setting forth standards and
procedures for allowing the patent owner to move to amend the
patent under subsection (d) to cancel a challenged claim or propose a
reasonable number of substitute claims . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(9). The
final rule issued by the Director limits patent owners to one motion to
amend as of right and one additional motion to amend with a showing
of good cause. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.221; Iancu, Haber & Iglesias, supra
note 56, at 568–70 (discussing the change from the amendment-andresponse format to one that leads quickly to a final disposition). As of
spring 2016, however, this practice may be changing. See Director’s
Forum: A Blog from USPTO’s Leadership, PTAB Issues Final Rules for
Improved Proceedings, USPTO.GOV, (Mar. 31, 2016, 2:36 PM),
http://www.uspto.gov/blog.
60

See Love & Ambwani, supra note 48, at 96–97 (reporting that
between September 16, 2012 and March 31, 2014, challengers filed a
total of 979 petitions, “roughly half the total number of requests for
61
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effect: the mere perception that inter partes review is a useful
tool for patent challengers, along with both the flurry of
publicity accompanying the signing of the America Invents Act
and commentary on all its changes, might be driving some of
these filings. However, there is also a sense that these changes
are real and meaningful and that inter partes review is a much
more effective procedural mechanism for patent challengers
than inter partes reexamination ever could have been.62
A logical reading of this result is that it is a positive. After all,
a driving motivation for implementing inter partes review was
to establish a viable proceeding at the PTO to hear challenges
involving “questionable” or “low-quality” patents.63 Inter partes

inter partes reexamination filed over the course of the thirteen years
prior”).
See, e.g., Steven J. Baughman, Special Report: Advantages of the
Defensive Use of US Patent Reexaminations for Companies Based
Abroad, BUREAU NA’L AFF. 32, 33–36 (2011) (outlining the “significant
potential benefits” using inter partes reexamination); Douglas Duff,
The Reexamination Power of Patent Infringers and the Forgotten
Inventor, 41 CAP. U. L. REV. 693, 698–705 (2013) (discussing the
popularity of inter partes review and providing reasons for its
popularity); Love & Ambwani, supra note 48, at 99 (commenting that
inter partes review “is considerably more powerful than inter partes
reexamination”).
62

See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, A Report by the Federal Trade
Commission October 2003, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY at 8 (2003),
http:// www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf. (“Because
existing means for challenging questionable patents are inadequate,
we recommend an administrative procedure for post-grant review
and opposition that allows for meaningful challenges to patent
validity short of federal court litigation.”) (emphasis added); Comm.
on Intellectual Prop. Rights in the Knowledge-Based Econ., Bd. On Sci.,
Tech., and Econ. Policy, Nat'l Research Council of the Nat'l Acads., A
Patent System for the 21st Century, at 95 (Stephen A. Merrill, Richard
C. Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004) (recommending adoption of an
“Open Review” system to address low-quality patents); see also Kesan,
supra note 48, at 248–51 (arguing that inter partes review will
improve overall patent quality) (emphasis added). This goal of only
allowing inter partes review for questionable patents can also be seen
in the threshold requirement for initiation of an IPR: that there is a
“reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect
to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314.
In practice, however, inter partes review is routinely initiated. See
Love & Ambwani, supra note 48, at 101 (reporting that out of the 823
63
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review furthers this purpose: it weeds out the “low-quality
patents” via administrative challenges rather than costly
infringement proceedings.
A second post-issuance mechanism introduced by the
America Invents Act, the covered business method (CBM)
review,64 represents an even more deliberate attempt to allow
patent challengers to eliminate and weaken certain types of
patents after they are issued.
The history of business method patents is well
documented,65 and there is no need to repeat it in depth here. It
is enough to simply recognize that some innovation takes the
form of computer-implemented financial tasks and other
business methods. Consider, for example, Amazon’s infamous 1click patent.66 A fundamental issue underlying this type of
patent is whether it claims ideas that are too abstract to be
patentable.
For a while, the answer was generally no; business methods
could be patented. In the Federal Circuit’s 1998 decision in State
Street Bank,67 the court held that business methods could be
patentable, as long as they produce a “useful, concrete and

petition with an institution decision, 84% had at least 1 claim
instituted and 74% had all challenged claims instituted).
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18, 125 Stat.
284, 329–31 (2011). In addition to inter partes review and CBM
Review, the AIA also introduced a post-grant review mechanism that
is available for nine months after a patent issues. See §§ 321–29, 125
Stat. at 306–13. Generally speaking, the same points discussed in this
Part could apply to post-grant review. That said, since post-grant
review is limited to only a short window after a patent issues, it could
thus be viewed more as part of the process of ensuring that a valid
right is issued in the first place (similar to trademark registration’s
opposition period) than invoking malleability.
64

See, e.g., Megan M. La Belle & Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Big Banks
and Business Method Patents, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 431 (2014); Mark A.
Lemley, Michael Risch, Ted Sichelman, & R. Polk Wagner, Life After
Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315 (2011); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible
Inventions After Bilski: History and Theory, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 53 (2011).
65

66

U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (filed Sept. 28, 1999).

State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
67
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tangible result,” in this case, “share prices.”68 The result was that
business methods were, generally, patentable subject matter.
However, in 2010, the Supreme Court issued its decision in
Bilski v. Kappos which offers patent challengers a new tool for
contesting business method patents: the requirement of
patentable subject matter.69 The Supreme Court’s Bilski
decision did not simply breathe new life into the relatively
dormant doctrine;70 it was a Frankensteinian surge.71 The
reaction to Bilski was both swift and great: Section 101 rose
from the ashes to become a significant (perhaps the most
significant, in the case of software-based patents), limitation on
patents, one that has spawned more recent Supreme Court
decisions—all enhancing the scrutiny patents face under this
requirement—than any other issue in patent law.72
Corresponding with the rise of Section 101 as a meaningful
limitation on patents, Congress, as part of the America Invents
Act, implemented a special procedural mechanism to allow
parties to challenge business method patents at the PTO after

Id. at 1373 (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1543 (Fed. Cir.
1994), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008)); see
also La Belle & Schooner, supra note 65, at 445; Lemley, Risch,
Schelman & Wagner, supra note 65, at 1318.
68

35 U.S.C. § 101. The outcome of Bilski was not a complete surprise;
the Federal Circuit’s 2008 decision had, after all, affirmed the patent
office’s rejection of Bilski’s claims, Bilski, 545 F.3d at 949.
69

See CRAIG ALLEN NARD & R. POLK WAGNER, PATENT LAW 122–23 (1st
ed. 2008) (“The tale of the modern application of § 101 is one of
uncertainty, debate, and (especially) gradually receding
importance.”); Lemley, Risch, Schelman & Wagner, supra note 65, at
1318 (“For a decade after 1998, patentable subject matter was
effectively a dead letter.”).
70

And indeed, Frankenstein is a perfect metaphor for post-Bilski
Section 101 jurisprudence.
71

Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) (holding
method for mitigating settlement risk as not patent eligible under §
101); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2107 (2013) (holding isolated DNA is not patent eligible under § 101);
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289
(2012) (holding a method for administering drug, measuring
metabolite levels, and issuing warnings is not patent eligible under §
101).
72
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issuance. From at least one Senator’s perspective, the purpose
of this procedure was clear:
Recent court decisions . . . have sharply pulled back on the
patenting of business methods, emphasizing that these
“inventions” are too abstract to be patentable. In the intervening
years, however, PTO was forced to issue a large number of
business-method patents, many or possibly all of which are no
longer valid. The Schumer proceeding offers a relatively cheap
alternative to civil litigation for challenging these patents, and
will reduce the burden on the courts of dealing with the
backwash of invalid business method patents.73
The CBM review mechanism allows parties to challenge the
validity of business method patents that, under then-current
law, were presumed valid when issued but, under the
intervening court decisions, are no longer valid.
As with the inter partes review proceeding, the results of the
CBM review can be seen as desirable. Patents that never should
have issued are being weeded out, and no longer operate to
grant their owners exclusive rights.
B. Unidirectional Malleability
Consider, however, how looking at patent rights as malleable
impacts this view. If indeed the scope and strength of a patent
depend substantially on the actions of those who interact with
the patent after its issuance, perhaps more so than on the
inherent characteristics of the patent itself, then inter partes
review is not merely a tool to be brought to bear on “lowquality” patents. It is a tool that rational parties and skilled
lawyers will bring to bear whenever threatened with a patent.74
Unsurprisingly, the patents being challenged through inter
partes review are also overwhelmingly involved in infringement

157 CONG. REC. S1367 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Jon
Kyl).
73

See Jacob Sherkow, Administrating Patent Litigation, 90 WASH. L.
REV. 205, 260 (observing that “[t]hese loose restrictions on the
availability of alternative for a to patent litigation make the
procedures ripe for abuse”).
74
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suits.75 And there are many inter partes reviews being
instituted; the PTO reported 1,737 petitions filed in financial
year 2015 resulting in 801 inter partes proceedings being
instituted.76 CBM review is less common, with only 149
petitions filed in financial year 2015, 77but it is still seeing use.
Just as with infringement trials, malleability can manifest in
these post-issuance proceedings at the PTO. As in infringement
proceedings, malleability allows the challenger to push and pull
on the scope and strength of the patent. The challenger can
choose to initiate an inter partes review; the challenger selects
the prior art to assert in the inter partes review; the challenger
chooses which claims to target; the challenger offers the first
claim construction.78 To these are added all the standard forms
in which malleability exists: the elastic nature of claim scope
relative to what is disclosed, for example.79 Since the patent
rights are malleable, this allows the challenger to push them in
the direction that favors the outcome desired by the patent
challenger.
But unlike in infringement actions, that malleability is
unidirectional in that it largely only operates to the detriment of
the patent owner.80 If the patent challenger wins, the claims are
declared unpatentable and hence no longer an exclusionary
See Love & Ambwani, supra note 48, at 103 (reporting that “in 80
percent of IPRs, the challenged patent was also asserted in litigation
between the petitioner and respondent.).
75

Patent Trial and Appeal Board AIA Progress: Statistics (as of
2/29/2016),
U.S.
PAT.
&
TRADEMARK
OFF.,
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016-229%20PTAB.pdf. (last visited Apr. 2, 2016).
76

77

Id.

Adding to this point, the patent challenger in inter partes review
need not be a defendant in an infringement suit brought by the patent
holder, or even a competitor. Anyone can initiate an inter partes
review. See Sherkow, supra note 74, at 231 (“Any person “other than
the patent owner” may bring petitions for inter partes and post-grant
reviews.”).
78

79

Rantanen, supra note 2, at 28–30.

C.f. Chiang, supra note 51, at 581 (explaining that inter partes
reexamination offered advantages for the petitioner and relatively
little downside).
80
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right. On the other hand, if the patent owner wins, the result is
essentially the status quo: it keeps the claims that it already had.
In contrast, if the patent owner prevails in an infringement
proceeding, it obtains a judgment of infringement, entitling it to
remedies such as damages and an injunction.81 The result is that
the challenger can push on the scope of the patent to maximize
the likelihood of its invalidity while not bearing the countering
risk of maximizing its chances of an infringement finding. In
short, it turns Giles Rich’s aphorism that “the stronger a patent
the weaker it is and the weaker a patent the stronger it is” on its
head.82
To be fair, there are some benefits that accrue to the patent
owner. The patent owner gains the benefit of estoppel against
that particular challenger with respect to “any ground that the
petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during that
inter partes review.”83 Although the exact scope of the
“reasonably could have raised” language remains unsettled, it
unquestionably excludes invalidity arguments such as
indefiniteness, lack of patentable subject matter, or failure to
comply with the disclosure requirements of § 112(a), as these
arguments cannot be raised in an inter partes review petition.84
Thus, if the patent challenger loses on the inter partes review, it
can still defend itself on infringement and other invalidity
grounds at the district court.
In addition, the patent challenger will not be bound by the
claim construction it proffered during inter partes review when
it comes time to argue noninfringement at the district court.85
The PTO analyzes the validity of claims under a “broadest

81

See 35 U.S.C. § 283, 284.

Giles S. Rich, The Proposed Patent Legislation: Some Comments, 35
GEO WASH. L. REV. 641, 644 (1967).
82

83

35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2).

See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (“A petitioner in an inter partes review may
request to cancel as unpatentable 1 or more claims of a patent only on
a ground that could be raised under section 102 or 103 and only on
the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed publications.”).
84

See Director’s Forum: A Blog from USPTO’s Leadership, supra note
60.
85
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reasonable interpretation” standard of claim construction.86
The purpose of this standard is to ensure that all possible
invalidity arguments are considered at the PTO.87 Proceedings
at the district court, however, simply construe the claim term,
which results in a potentially narrower claim scope.88 This
combination allows the patent challenger to argue invalidity
during inter partes review using the broader claim scope (thus
increasing the likelihood of invalidity) and noninfringement at
the district court proceeding using the narrower claim scope
(thus increasing the likelihood of no infringement).89
CBM review represents an even stronger case of a
procedural mechanism that allows malleability to operate in a
way that is only to the disadvantage of patent owners. As with
inter partes review, CBM review is largely one-sided in its effect.
A successful petitioner in CBM review can eliminate or
See Dawn-Marie Bey & Christopher A. Cotropia, The
Unreasonableness of the Patent Office’s “Broadest Reasonable
Interpretation” Standard 37 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N Q. J. 285 (2009)
(describing the broadest reasonable interpretation standard). This
standard applies to inter partes review. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.3001(b) (“A
claim in an unexpired patent shall be given its broadest reasonable
construction in light of the specification of the patent in which it
appears.”); Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756,
48,764 (Aug. 14, 2012) (“The Office has for decades employed the
broadest reasonable interpretation standard to construe claims
before the Office, and it will continue to do so in IPR, PGR, and CBM
proceedings for construing challenged claims as well as any amended
or new claims.”); Gregory Dolin & Irina D. Manta, Taking Patents,
WASH. & LEE L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
86

See Bey & Cotropia, supra note 86, at 291 (“The standard allegedly
helps the USPTO avoid erroneously blessing a claim as patentable
when a district court may construe the same claim more broadly than
the USPTO had considered, with the resulting increase in scope
capturing prior art or an obvious variation of the prior art.”).
87

See id. at 287–88 (describing the district court approach to claim
construction).
88

C.f. id. at 303–06 (pointing out the potential difference between
claim scope under USPTO methodology and claim scope under district
court methodology.); Mike's Train House, Inc. v. Broadway Ltd.
Imports, LLC, No. 1:09–CV–02657–JKB, 2012 WL 664498, at *22 (D.
Md. Feb. 27, 2012), aff'd, 500 F. App'x 958 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (rejecting
patent holder’s argument that estoppel applied based on accused
infringer’s allegedly different claim constructions in ex parte
reexamination and infringement proceeding).
89
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substantially reduce the scope of an issued patent.90 A
successful patent holder, on the other hand, merely maintains
the status quo: it keeps the same rights that it previously held.
While, as with inter partes review, there are some potential
benefits that a patent owner can reap—estoppel as to that
particular patent challenger, a non-binding but potentially
persuasive decision by the PTO that the patent is valid as against
the particular legal challenge, and an opportunity to strengthen
the claims through amendment91—but they are more like door
prizes that reduce the downside of CBM review and offer little
upside.
Still, the patent holder does have some choices to make and
some ability to use the malleability of patent rights in its favor.
As discussed above, patent holders can (theoretically, at least)
amend their claims during inter partes review and potentially
emerge with claims that are stronger from a validity standpoint
but that still encompass the challenger’s products or methods.92
Patent holders can also argue issues of claim construction and
respond to invalidity arguments, thus pushing to expand the
scope and strength of the patent.93 And if the patent owner
succeeds, it may obtain at least a gloss of strength for the patent.
90 See

generally P. Andrew Riley, Jonathan R.K. Stroud & Jeffrey Totten
The Surprising Breadth of Post-Grant Review for Covered-BusinessMethod Patents: A New Way to Challenge Patent Claims, 15 COLUM. SCI.
& TECH. L. REV. 235 (2014) (describing the CBM review, its benefits,
and legislative history).
See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18, 125
Stat. 284, 329–31 (2011).
91

But see Love & Ambwani, supra note 48, at 101–02 (reporting that
“[t]o date, the PTAB has granted just a single motion to amend—one
that was both unopposed and filed by the United States itself”).
Recently, the PTO amended its rules to allow longer motions to amend
claims, see Rules for Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial and
Appeal Board, 80 Fed. Reg. 28561, 28565 (May 19, 2015) (to be
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42) (increasing page limit for motions to
amend from 15 pages to 25 pages), and it is considering other changes
to the claim amendment process. See Michelle K. Lee, PTAB’S QuickFixes for AIA Rules Are to Be Implemented Immediately, DIRECTOR’S
FORUM: A BLOG FROM USPTO’S LEADERSHIP (Mar. 27, 2015, 10:18 AM)
www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/ptab_s_quick_fixes_for.
92

Note that simply because the PTO uses a “broadest reasonable
construction” standard does not mean that the claim scope
encompasses everything under the sun. Claim construction can still
93
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So should we be troubled by the unidirectional manner in
which malleability operates in inter partes and CBM review? I
think so. Unlike in the infringement suit context, where both
patent owners and accused infringers have at least the
opportunity to benefit from malleability inherent in patent
rights, these post-grant procedures put a thumb on the side of
the patent challenger. This concern is exacerbated by the use of
the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, which places
a thumb on the side of the patent challenger. Indeed, although
there are a variety of arguments as to why the broadest
reasonable interpretation standard should not be applied in
inter partes and CBM review,94 it is the interaction between that
standard and the malleability of patent rights that may be the
strongest policy argument against its application.

Conclusion
The Malleability of Patent Rights introduced the idea that patent
rights should not be viewed as static rights, fixed forever at a
precise moment in time. Rather, it suggested that those rights
should properly be viewed as malleable, that is, changeable (to
at least some degree) even after issuance. And it argued that this
change need not accompany an increase in the value of the
underlying technology but rather could take the form of an
expansion in scope of the rights themselves.
This view of patent rights, as malleable rights, is not merely
a theoretical construct; it affects fundamental perceptions of
how aspects of the patent system are valued. Because patent
rights are malleable, the conventional efficient-inventor
narrative isn’t quite as convincing as it seems, even when taken
at face value.
The malleable nature of patent rights also offers a different
perspective on patent reform efforts. This perspective requires
be necessary to arrive at that reasonable scope, and it is not clear that
there is a meaningful difference between the two standards in every
instance.
Such as Greg Dolin & Irina Manta’s Fifth Amendment takings-clause
argument, see Dolin, supra note 86; but see Camilla A. Hrdy & Ben
Picozzi, The AIA Is Not a Taking: A Response to Dolin & Manta, 72 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. ONLINE 472 (2016) (responding to Dolin & Manta).
94
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a greater appreciation of the impact inter partes review and
covered business method review have: to allow patent
challengers greater ability to shrink—if not eliminate—the
scope of issued patent rights without allowing patent owners
much of an opportunity to use malleability in their favor.

